During the Cold War, Havana symbolised the struggle for national liberation in Latin America. Yet like few other places the Cuban Revolution's visions of development materialised in the southern city of Cienfuegos. This article examines why two half-finished nuclear reactors and a decaying 'nuclear city' remain in Cienfuegos today. Through a comprehensive spatial and infrastructural transformation of Cuba, the revolutionary government sought to remedy the evils of dependency and unequal exchange. Cienfuegos and its shifting place in the Cold War political economy demonstrates how a radical critique of urbanisation merged with the spatiality of centralised energy infrastructure in the pursuit of ultimately-failed nuclear modernity. The history of Cienfuegos draws the academic gaze away from Latin America's major cities to widen the geographies of theory in urban, energy, and Latin American studies.
The revolutionary government turned its attention to Cienfuegos in the 1960s to develop the country's industrial capacity away from the Cuban capital. The Havana Declarations asserted Cuba's independence from the neo-colonial world order, but the injustices of dependency could only be remedied by industrialising and urbanising the deprived regions. As architectural historian Roberto Segre argues, the revolutionary leadership neglected Havana to create a homogenous urban fabric across the island. 1 In Fidel Castro's words, there would be 'a minimum of urbanism and a maximum of ruralism' when the Revolution transformed the country in its entirety. 2 On Cuba's southern shores (Map 1), Cienfuegos became a key node in an international network that would allow the country to develop under historically fair conditions.
Map 1. Cienfuegos, Cuba
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Alongside Cuba's spatial transformation, the revolutionary government developed a distinct mode of energy infrastructure in Cienfuegos. Echoing Lenin's maxim that 'Communism is equal to Soviet power plus electrification of the whole country', they invested heavily in a unified national electricity system, in the first instance powered with Soviet fuel oil. In the Cuban Marxist-Leninist reading of history, oil-based electricity was a material precondition for the nation's transition to communism. As Cuba reached higher levels of social development, however, oil would give way to nuclear energy, epitomising the Revolution's ability to transform the techno-material base of the national economy. While Cuba established a nuclear programme in 1976, starting work on a first reactor in 1983, nuclear development also materialised in new urban form across the Bay of Cienfuegos in the Ciudad Nuclear (Nuclear City).
This article examines the place of Cienfuegos and the Ciudad Nuclear in the ideational world of the revolutionary leadership and explores how the city developed through industrial investments as part of the socialist international political economy. I draw on geographer Doreen Massey's work to argue that cities should be understood relationally, as places that form through actions and processes that extend beyond them in space and time. 3 Cienfuegos then serves as a prism for understanding the socio-political significance of urban change and energy development as one simultaneous process in the Cuban Cold War period. The focus on Cienfuegos contributes to an understanding of the Cold War where Cuba's national history is seen neither as 'an extension of empire' nor through the primary lens of bipolar conflict. 4 Cienfuegos also prompts us to look beyond the region's major cities, whose significance are frequently overemphasised in urban and Latin American studies, granted their history as symbols of European power and dominance. 5 The city further brings alternative circulations of knowledge to light in social science research on energy. This is a research field that predominantly has emerged from the encounter with a small set of countries in Western Europe and North America. 6 Cuba's joint urban and energy development demonstrates how leaders and planners attempted to enact social change through a radical spatio-infrastructural transformation, aiming not only to break with the colonial past, but to bring nuclear modernity to the Caribbean. The effects of this transformation today raise questions about the links between urban form, energy infrastructure, and political economy in Cuba's Cold War and after.
From Urban Dependency to Urban Revolution
In the eighteenth century, Havana developed into Cuba's all-dominating urban centre. The capital constituted a key node in the Spanish imperial economy. In particular, control over Havana gave access to the transatlantic route on the westerlies, allowing ships to sail from the Americas to Europe. 7 When Spain ceded Cuba to the United States in 1898, Havana also kept its status an outward-looking colonial hub. Beyond its harbour, the city provided spaces for political and economic administration over resource extraction in the sugar-producing hinterlands. Within Cuba, the seasonal rhythm of the sugar industry meant that work was abundant in the hinterlands during the labour-intense zafra (harvest). The dreaded period between harvests, usually lasting from June to December, was known as the tiempo muerto (dead period), and to escape it, rural dwellers migrated to Havana in search for jobs. 8 To the revolutionary leadership, the tiempo muerto, urbanisation, and Havana's primacy resulted from Cuba's incorporation into the colonial world economy. 'Do you think that if we would have had the possibility to start planning the entirety of this country, we would have overindulged ourselves with a city as big as Havana?' Fidel Castro notably declared to a crowd in Oriente Province in 1966. 'Those enormous urban concentrations are anti-economic', he suggested, 'they are unaffordable; they are enormous human concentrations.' 9 In the colonial metropoles, whether 7 Alfred Crosby, Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900-1900, 2 nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 127-8. 8 García, Beyond the Walled City. 9 Castro Ruz, '[El encuentro] con los integrantes de la marcha al Segundo Frente "Frank País"'. The use of Fidel Castro's speeches as primary sources in the following is less motivated by their factual claims about historical events and more by their importance for reconstructing the revolutionary leadership's ideational world. Even so, his in Europe or North America, urbanisation had been the product of industrialisation. In Latin America and the Caribbean, by contrast, urbanisation resulted from colonial resource extraction serving the metropole's industrial development. Without domestic industrialisation, Havana was draining Cuba's rural areas of resources while large parts of the urban population remained in poverty without employment. 10 Among Latin American dependista theorists more widely, this analysis gave rise to notions of 'urban inflation' and 'overurbanisation' when the 'surplus of unproductive population' was destined to live in slums and work in the informal economy. 11
Having entered Havana in January 1959, Fidel Castro's new government soon set up a Department of Physical Planning to oversee Cuba's urban and regional development. According to its first director, Felipe Prestamo, the intention at this point was to focus on regions away from Havana. 12 On the one hand, the government sought to reduce the primacy of the capital in terms of economic activity and population growth. By turning away from it, the dependency relation between Havana and its hinterlands would be broken, allowing the deprived regions to develop. and was entitled to a basket of foodstuffs and consumer goods to be collected in an integrated system of ration shops (bodegas). As infrastructural spaces for centralised redistribution, the bodegas constituted moments in the production of urban space but also in the nationally-integrated socialist state. With urban infrastructures, the state extended its power to logistically implement political decisions, aiming to transform living conditions throughout the country. 18 As Kale has shown in the case of electrification in independent India, electricity -on a par with the bodega -was 'both object of and mechanism for' the formation of the socialist state in that it simultaneously symbolised and enabled socialist urban practice. 19 Hardly by accident, the Cuban census came to define urban areas as much based on population density as the accessibility of urban infrastructures -socio-technically integrating and coordinating the socialist state. 20
From the government's point of view, the urban restructuring of Cuba would follow alongside a transformation of the nation's economic structure. After the Revolution, urbanisation would be coeval with industrialisation. The territorial extension of networked electricity infrastructure was essential to this task, as we shall see. The effects of industrialisation would be as much socio-economic as spatial. When the state opened factories and educated the workforce, the productive forces would develop, and workers would agglomerate in urban areas. Factories would also generate work for the already deprived urban populations. In the countryside, Fidel Castro urged small-farmers to move towards 'superior forms of production' -a shorthand for collectivisation and mechanisation. 21 Susman argues that the new regional focus was successful in as much as migration to Havana slowed during the 1960s. 26 If you analyse it, there is a very unequal distribution of resources in the nation, because with man's exploitation of man having disappeared or being under way of totally disappearing in the sense of existing proprietary classes and dispossessed classes, we find ourselves with a sub-product of capitalist exploitation, which is the exploitation of the countryside by the city. 29 In 1969, as a result, Fidel Castro announced that his government would focus most of its attention on three major regions with pre-existing infrastructural development. 30 New industrialisation projects would be allocated to the provinces of Havana, Oriente, and Las Villas. In Las Villas, Cienfuegos was the regional centre.
Industrialisation in Cienfuegos
Despite Havana's primacy, Cienfuegos had developed into a regional economic centre over the estimates that up to 30,000 French settlers arrived in Cuba in the 1790s. Given that Haiti (then Saint Domingue) had been the world's leading sugar colony for much of the eighteenth century, the French migrants brought capital and experiences in sugar but also coffee farming with them. When Santa Clara was connected to Cienfuegos by rail in 1850, Cienfuegos thus turned into a regional hub in the colonial export-economy. 32 The urban form of Cienfuegos still reflects its historical role in the colonial political economy: the harbour constitutes the city's western perimeter, and the city then pivots around a central plaza, the Parque José Martí (prior to 1902, the Plaza de Armas), with a cathedral devoted to Virgin Mary and former offices for the colonial ayuntamiento (city council) and merchant corporations ( Figure 1) . A pedestrian walkway, the Paseo de Prado, extends north to south, forming a spine in a perfect orthogonal city grid. When the town centre was nominated to become a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 2005, the application file suggested that '[t]he city's elegant and perfect neo-classical design, with the shape of a chessboard which extends along its urban perimeter, constitutes an exceptional exponent of the Cuban and Caribbean 19 th Century'. 33
Figure 1. Parque José Martí, Cienfuegos
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In the 1960s, Cienfuegos retained its role as a regional economic centre. Initially, the revolutionary government had attempted to diversify the national economy, identifying the sugar monoculture as the source of Cuban underdevelopment. A return to sugar, however, provided an immediate source of export revenue for the financially-strained government. 34 To blame a crop for the country's underdevelopment was also from a Marxist point of view to fetishise it, attributing agency to a thing rather than the social relations it embodied. Before long, the harbour 32 in Cienfuegos again constituted an essential outward-looking node in a global network revolving around cane sugar. But now a radically different set of social relations were seen to meet in this node, facilitating regional industrialisation and urbanisation. Cuban sugar shipments were no longer destined for Spain or the United States but the Soviet Union and the member-states of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). 35 The Cuban government struck a first trade deal with the Soviet Union in February 1960, including 900,000 tons of oil, which were estimated to save Cuba 24 million dollars in one year.
Facing US discontent, the Cuban government argued that it was their right as a sovereign nation to trade with whomever they liked, stressing that even US-aligned Brazil was trading with the Soviet Union. 36 In comparison, the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev was pursuing an export- The revolutionary government increasingly identified sugar as a vehicle for industrialisation of the agrarian economy. Unusually for a crop, sugarcane lends itself well to centralised production.
Production requires a large mill (aptly known as a 'central') where cane stalks can be crushed quickly to avoid fermentation. 40 In Cuba, Roberto Segre argues, the centrals were 'true "factories" situated in rural areas'. 41 Around them, company towns known as bateyes provided spaces for business management and worker accommodation. Thus, the centrals -carrying urban formwere a means to overcome the contradiction between city and countryside.
While increasing the country's export-capacity, the 'Tricontinental' was also key to the mechanisation of the sugar sector. In 1978, Fidel Castro inaugurated a similar terminal in the province of Las Tunas and explained that the 'Tricontinental' had served the Cuban people in two ways. On the one hand, it had saved the country hard currency as bulk loading took away the need 38 for sugar sacks. Sacks had to be imported from abroad. Over the past decade, more than 10 million tons of sugar had been loaded in Cienfuegos, and counting savings from sack purchases alone, Fidel Castro estimated that this equalled around 50 million unspent pesos in hard currency. 42 On the other hand, the mechanisation of sugar loading had saved Cuban workers hundreds of thousands of hours of hard labour. Sugar sacks had to be carried, but bulk loading was automatic. In a capitalist society, Fidel Castro argued, mechanisation would have taken labourtime away from the worker, the machine competing with the worker for labour. But in socialist Cuba, the machines in the 'Tricontinental' had instead liberated Cuban harbour workers from hard labour as the machines were put to use in the workers' own interest. 'That is was socialism entails', Fidel explained, 'that when a technology is introduced it is not to enslave the worker, it is not to exploit the worker, it is not to make the worker redundant, but to help him. And so, the technology liberates thousands of our harbour workers from that hard labour.' 43 reported that the plant would employ 111 workers and produce 40 tons of yeast per day. 44 They had localised the factory at the site of a large sugar central, the CAI 'Antonio Sánchez'. To grow torula, workers would allow bacteria to ferment cane syrup (miel) deriving from the mill.
Production also required water, ammonium phosphate, and urea, and the two latter products would derive from the fertiliser plant in O'Bourke, which was of British origin. 45 One of the largest factories -the 'Carlos Marx' -would produce cement. This factory was located by a large limestone formation in Guaibaro, just outside Cienfuegos. The 'Carlos Marx' was imported from East Germany, and to this end, the German Democratic Republic reportedly provided Cuba with a 60-million-peso credit, to be repaid over 10 years at 2 per cent interest. Cuba had to start repaying the credit as soon as the first of three production lines became active. 50 The cement, in turn, would primarily be used for housing construction to meet the demand for urban accommodation. For construction purposes, three factories produced prefabricated housing modules in Cienfuegos. The most advanced of these employed the IMS system, a Yugoslav construction technology using prefabricated concrete structures to build multi-story buildings. 51 To inaugurate the cement factory, the East German leader Erich Honecker visited in Pinar del Río. One day, Cuba would rely on nuclear fission alone for electricity generation. 60 Electrification, in turn, was critical to the successful infrastructural integration of Cuba. With a centrally-controlled national grid, industrial production was not geographically limited to places with energy resources in situ but could be 'rationally' developed by the socialist government without concern for limited energy supplies.
The reactors had a Soviet design known as VVER-440. 'VVER' was the Russian acronym for water-water energy reactor, meaning that pressurised water would be used to cool and moderate the reactor core. '440' implied that the reactors normally would have a capacity of 440 MW. Cuba nonetheless opted for a plant with several non-standard features for the reactor type. Model V-318 would have containment buildings to prevent radioactive fallout in the case of a meltdown.
The buildings would also resist the shockwave from a direct aircraft hit. As Cienfuegos was located in a seismically active area, moreover, the reactors were designed to withstand an earthquake. The plant was sited at only 17 metres above sea-level, which would ensure that it had a continuous supply of cooling-water in the event of a tsunami. 61 The likelihood of a tsunami forming in the Caribbean Sea was one in 10,000 years, according to Fidel Castro, and in government discourse, the precautions taken even in this regard attested to the level of safety characterising the project. 62 As a result, the reactors would also have a lower electrical output than the standard Soviet model.
Nuclear power again resonated with the belief in technology as a liberating force, which would bring socialist development to Cuba. The plant would develop the country's productive forces in one nuclear leap, thrusting Cuba on to a higher stage of techno-material development. Already in the Moncada Programme, Fidel Castro suggested that nuclear energy would allow a progressive government to electrify the entire country, 'given that the application of nuclear energy is now a reality in this branch of industry'. 63 In 1984, he boasted that the first reactor then under construction in Juraguá would have a greater capacity on its own than the combined electrical industry prior to the Revolution. 64 In all of Latin America, only Argentina and Brazil had successfully developed nuclear capacity with their Atucha, Embalse, and Angra plants. 65 Thus, the nuclear reactors in Juraguá testified to the progress the Revolution brought not only to Cuba, but to Central America and the Caribbean. 66 It is important to remember that the modernisation process essentially had the same material Studying the Cuban nuclear programme, the US-based scholar Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado suggests that the Cuban leadership pursued the project above all for international prestige. 69 In
Cuba, by contrast, the Executive Secretary of the Cuban Atomic Energy Commission (CEAC)
argued that Cuba ought to be entitled to nuclear power as a sovereign nation. 70 Czechoslovakia, and the plant was later expanded with two generators from Japan, each good for 169 MW. 74 A short distance from the power plant, the government also sited a new oil refinery to be built with Soviet support in the course of the 1980s. It was the largest industrial project in the region beside the nuclear plant. 75 The refinery's bayside location would facilitate Cuban petroleum exports, but the fuel oil coming out of it could conveniently be used in the thermoelectric down the road. 76 Hence, also in the energy sector, Cienfuegos entered into in a network of socio-ecological Here, however, the nuclear power plant would play a highly strategical role in the eyes of the revolutionary government. The propaganda film from TeleNuclear asserted that the plant would 'represent a qualitative change in the national energy system'. 77 cent, even as Fidel Castro declared that the country had entered a 'special period in peacetime'. 101 The refinery in O'Bourke still opened in 1991 but had to close again four years later due to a lack of crude supply. In and around Cuba's sugar centrals, production grinded to a halt. Las Villas' sugar fields lay deprived of synthetic fertilisers and pesticides, and the industrial machinery was lifeless without diesel, fuel, and lubricant oils. 102 As work stopped on the nuclear reactors, the construction of the Ciudad Nuclear also ended abruptly. While people still live in the urban enclave across the bay -both Cubans and a few Russians who remained -many buildings were never finished. Left to the salty sea-winds, some are today in danger of collapse. In defence of the nuclear programme, Fidel Castro Díaz-Balart noted that approximately 1,300 Cubans had graduated as nuclear physicists from the Juraguá Electronuclear Polytechnic and Soviet universities by 1992. 103 Yet none of them had a nuclear plant where they could put their knowledge to work. Their high-modern city, a long distance away from the Cuban capital, was falling into decay. In large numbers, Cubans from eastern and central provinces migrated to Havana during the special period in search of employment; 'a process that mirrors migration flows in pre-revolutionary Cuba', de la Fuente notes. When 92,000 Cubans were applying for residential status in Havana in the spring of 1997, the government banned all migration to the capital as unemployed newcomers often ended up living in 'subhuman conditions'. 104 In the past decade, however, Cienfuegos has seen renewed investment. In 2007, Raúl Castro and Hugo Chávez re-inaugurated the oil refinery following extensive retrofitting, making Cienfuegos a key node in PetroCaribe. PetroCaribe has been an oil-trading bloc dominated by Venezuela and Cuba but by 2014 comprising nineteen member-states. The bloc was founded to overcome the challenges faced by the Caribbean's island-states, given their heavy oil-import dependence and low purchasing power on the world market -unequal exchange, in other words. 105 A Cuban-Venezuelan joint-venture, Cuvenpetrol S.A., has operated the refinery, which has constituted the single largest project to have integrated the Cuban and Venezuelan national economies since the mid-2000s. In 2007, Cuban families also moved into a new residential area north of O'Bourke, named the Reparto Simón Bolívar. The Venezuelan government had donated the prefabricated buildings in the area as part of PetroCaribe's social programmes. 106 The process of socialist urbanisation found new material expression in the Reparto Simón Bolívar, again tied to a historically-specific form of energy development. The houses in Simón Bolívar were petrocasas, so-called 'oil homes', made from the plastic polyvinyl chloride (PVC), produced in the Venezuelan petrochemical industry to derive social benefits from the country's oil wealth. 107 Despite this upswing, Cienfuegos' place is shifting again in the geometry of wider politicaleconomic relations. In August 2017, the Cuban government re-nationalised the refinery, reportedly responding to Venezuela's failure to pay for services incurred under the PetroCaribe agreement. 108 Cuba has also looked for new sources of oil as the Bolivarian Revolution has entered what may be a terminal state in Venezuela. In a process parallel to PetroCaribe, then, Cienfuegos was declared a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 2005, to the benefit of the Cuban tourism industry. The city constitutes an 'outstanding example' of modernist urban planning on Cuba's southern shores, the UNESCO motivation reads. 109 Unsurprisingly, this motivation refers not to the concrete slabs of the Ciudad Nuclear or the plastic walls of the Reparto Simón Bolívar but the colonial modernity of Cienfuegos' nineteenth-century town centre. Cienfuegos is today an important stop on the circuit for Western tourists whose purchasing power allows them to seek pleasure in Cuba's lowwage economy.
Conclusion
The rationale behind the policy for urban restructuring and centralised energy development 
